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Abstract 
Over the past half a century or more, historical, anthropological and philosophical examinations 
of the concept of play have remained largely situated in the arena of ontological discussion. In 
these previous interrogations of play, the notion of play has been assumed a priori, been defined 
stipulatively in relation to larger frameworks of games, or discarded altogether. 
 
This work adopts Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument as a lever to unpack the usefulness 
in looking at play from an epistemological perspective: paying special attention to linguistic 
cues, ostensive relationships and associated activities around those things players call ‘play’ 
within specific, behavioral, situational and linguistic contexts. This paper explores how 
unraveling the term ‘play’ in this way can potentially afford us a new perspective on play as an 
epistemologically dynamic phenomenon. 
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“Games have a long-running, deep and habitual association with ‘play’, itself a shallowly 
examined term.” 
Thomas Malaby 
 
“In the universal silence of nature and in the calm of the senses the immortal spirit’s hidden 
faculty of knowledge speaks an ineffable language and gives [us] undeveloped concepts, which 
are indeed felt, but do not let themselves be described.” 
Immanuel Kant 
 
Introduction 
 
Since the mid-to-late 20th century, there have emerged numerous theoretical treatments of the 
concept of ‘play’. These treatments have arisen from across a landscape of disciplines stretching 
from cultural anthropology to behavioralist psychology, but as has been recently remarked, the 
body of literature which makes up modern play canon has stumbled in its attempt to adequately 
define play in any substantial manner (Malaby, 2007; Galloway, 2006). Definitions have either 
remained too broad (Huizinga, 1950; Gadamer, 1976) or, in less frequent cases, too parochial 
(Callois, 1961; Hans, 1981). As Brian Sutton-Smith once mused, "any earnest definition of play 
has to be haunted by the possibility that playful enjoinders will render it invalid" (2001), and 
Sutton-Smith's own work, as well as the work of others, have frequently presented such 
enjoinders. 
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Sutton-Smith suggests that play can only be defined insofar as the rhetoric of a particular field or 
discipline allows. These rhetorics range from ‘animal play’ to ‘developmental child’s play’ – but 
is this as far as we can take an analysis of play? Are there rhetorics unaccounted for? Does even 
a vaguely outlined system of rhetorical categorization ultimately collapse upon itself under the 
weight of relativism, rendering such a system as questionable as the irreconcilable accounts of 
play held under it? 
  
With such questions unresolved, we are left with play as a term whose meaning is either 1) a 
priori or fully assumed, effectively rendering the term meaningless or; 2) at best defined entirely 
by its relationship to game-based engagement or a specific discipline of study. J. Barnard 
Gilmore asserts that, "everyone knows what play is not even if everyone can't agree on just what 
play is" (1971). This work will suggest that even Gilmore's first statement should be thoroughly 
re-evaluated. 
  
If notions of play have been corralled into a state of inconclusiveness and hesitation, how do we 
unpack play in a new or novel way that permits a greater understanding of it? Why should we 
have a greater understanding?  
  
A deeper analysis of play stands only to nourish our investigative endeavors in game studies and, 
more specifically, further inform the fervent study of massively multiplayer games that continues 
to blaze forward in the ‘World of Warcraft’ era of online gaming. Such an analysis might aid us 
in shuffling off a paradigmatic coil encrusted with false dichotomies that pit ‘work vs. play’ or 
‘play vs. ordinary life’ – dichotomies which have been notably polemicized in recent game 
studies research (Taylor 2006; Dibbell, 2006 & Galloway, 2006). Polarizing perspectives such as 
these have remained largely unproductive, presenting significant hindrances in our exploration of 
play as an experiential phenomenon. 
  
As will be suggested here, our inability to concretely define play may well be symptomatic of the 
concept defying ontological restraints. With modern day definitions of play tending towards a 
concatenation of previous interpretations of the term, we may have arrived at a point where our 
language ceases to be able to express the concept with any more acuity.  
  
Shifting our attention to language then, how do we come to know what it is that we call ‘play’ to 
begin with? How do we know how to label such a thing when we experience it? Moving away 
from an ontological emphasis, what might an epistemological examination of play look like? 
  
This paper adopts the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose examination of language supports the 
idea that a language is not only a culmination of words and utterances but also a meaningful 
activity: a practice that intones a particular organic quality and which is rooted in the dynamism 
of those participating. This work will use Wittgenstein’s Private Language argument in an effort 
to unpack a unique perspective on epistemologies of play through an examination of language 
use in describing activities which are both privately and publicly experienced. 
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Play and Private Language 
 
Wittgenstein previously argued that simply distilling the basic elements of games (for example, 
rules and outcomes) is a process that falls short of piecing together what a game can be defined 
as. He consequently asserted that the concept ‘game’ could not be contained by any single 
definition, but that games must be considered as a fluid body of concepts that share a "family 
resemblance" to one another (1953). It was family resemblances which could bring us close, but 
never quite to the point of understanding what a game truly is. For Wittgenstein, there is no 
conceptual essence to be sought. 
 
Concepts such as ‘game’ and ‘play’ are conceived of through comparison between phenomena, 
communal agreement, perceived similarity and context – all mediated by language. The 
derivation of family resemblances never stem from an unimpeachable level of objectivity, but 
rather an assumed context, a paradigm of inquiry, an epistemological foundation. To generate a 
concept of what constitutes ‘play’, Wittgenstein, like Sutton-Smith, would not need to go far 
before concluding that definitions of this concept would vary between disciplines. 
 
How did we learn to understand the word ‘plant’, then?  Perhaps we learnt a 
definition of the concept, say in botany, but I leave out that of account since it only 
has a role in botany.  Apart from that, it is clear that we learnt the meaning of the 
word by example; and if we disregard hypothetical dispositions, these examples 
stand only for themselves. 
(Wittgenstein, 1978, p. 117) 
 
This passage (and others like it in the Philosophical Investigations) is critical simply insofar as it 
interrogates the manner in which concepts like ‘play’ come to life, suggesting that concepts are 
not born of universal truth, but are products of fluctuating and often seemingly arbitrary origins. 
In the words of Gramsci, “a linguistic form can be expressive and justified inasmuch that is has 
function” (Ives, 2006). 
 
Given that we possess no sense of determinacy to validate any universal truth through our 
perceptions, the emergence of a concept is a constantly shifting and undulating process which 
wavers ever closer to determination, but never reaches it (Wittgenstein, 1953). This very process 
defies rigidity and instead reflects more of a Heideggerian notion of mindfulness: an ongoing 
cognizance of the shifting elements and contexts from which a given concept has emerged that 
permits us a greater understanding of that concept, but only ever fleeting contact with any 
transcendental knowledge that might be associated with it (Heidegger, 1976). 
 
Returning to play, we find ourselves in somewhat of a different predicament given the elusive 
nature of the term. Play clearly transcends the merely corporeal. It is immaterial even though 
there may be material evidence of its occurrence. It can be said that we each have our own 
‘play’, but that subjectivity is one often shared in practice. Play is something both publicly and 
privately experienced – often at the same time. How do we express those things which are not 
purely capable of being agreed upon through ostensive means? Can one point to a teammate 
during a game of hockey and authoritatively claim that they are playing? 
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For Gregory Bateson, “the actions of ‘play’ are related to or denote other actions of ‘not play’” 
(2006, p. 314). To rephrase, all things ‘play’ and ‘not play’ are denoted through cues or signals 
that we associate with either state. This is what Bateson refers to as the ‘nip’ and the ‘bite’; 
rooted in the observation that when animals play-fight, a nip denotes a bite, but never denotes 
what a real bite denotes. This theory of play revolves around the exchanging of signals between 
participants that indicate when play is happening and when it is not. 
 
For Bateson then, it is possible that we may point to a cue that we believe to be representative of 
‘play’ because we are surrounded by other signals that indicate play to us. This, by Bateson’s 
estimation, is a characteristic of unconscious, ‘primary-process’ thinking (2006). 
 
Thus, play does not take place in a magic circlei per se, but a ‘psychological frame’. Every act of 
‘metacommunication’ regarding a particular form of engagement psychologically ‘frames’ that 
act for the person engaging, and there are various forms of metacommunication which shape this 
framing: mood, performativity or even language (Bateson, 2006).  
 
However, metacommunication can culminate in what Bateson terms “paradoxes of play” where 
play is signaled, but is not actually occurring – or vice versa (2006, p. 324). It is precisely the 
occurrence of this paradox that prevents us from being able to ostensibly define play through 
example. A hockey player might be participating in a game of hockey and following the rules of 
the game but, psychologically, they may not be playing what philosopher Bernard Suits would 
refer to as the ‘institution’ of the game (1978). They may be playing by the rules, even playing to 
win, but the requisite lusory attitude – the mindset which commits them to playing a game for 
intrinsic purposes – may be absent (Suits, 1978). It could then be argued that Bernard Suits’ 
‘lusory attitude’ not only suggests voluntary mindfulness of participation as a requisite of 
gameplay, but that our own subjective knowledge of the conditions of that participation is 
requisite as wellii. 
 
This introduces the notion that although players might be partaking in what is the ‘nip’ of play 
(that activity which denotes play), this ‘nip’ does not necessarily denote what a player actually 
knows or believes to be play – and yet the cues would indicate that what is taking place is the 
‘genuine’ article. A hockey player may only be participating in a game for extrinsic gains.  
Despite being identifiable as play by a third party, such instrumental aims might or might not 
exclude this process from being called play by the player in question – just as players of 
massively multiplayer online games cannot entirely agree on whether their ‘level grinding’ is 
play or work (GW Forums, 2008). Play is as private a phenomenon as it is a shared one, but is 
not equally discernable between and/or within parties. 
 
As such, defining play here becomes an issue of how we come to know it rather than what it 
actually is; coming to grips with the multiple subjectivities of the phenomenon, and being able to 
discern the family resemblances between them. In this way, one might look at those things which 
we point to when we feel we know we’re witnessing or partaking in play, and then interrogating 
those signals which act as beacons of that knowledge. 
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Private Language 
 
Wittgenstein discusses epistemology tangentially in his work, given that his primary focus is on 
language use and meaning. However, his work addresses other concepts relevant to personally 
experienced phenomena – most notably the concept of a private language (1953). 
 
A private language, according to Wittgenstein, is a language that can only be comprehended by a 
single individual, remaining indecipherable by others. Such a language would theoretically be 
used to express personally experienced phenomena such as pain: something which could be 
demonstrated to others (for example, witnessing someone stubbing their toe), but could never be 
co-experienced with them. 
 
In Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein conducts a thought experiment that presupposes 
that only the person who feels a given pain has authority enough to express that pain accurately 
(1953). As such, if a person were to record every time they felt pain by writing down a particular 
symbol in a book based on the relative intensity of that pain, there is no manner in which another 
person could ever understand what those symbols meant considering that they never experienced 
the pain in question. This would theoretically make the symbols unintelligible to anyone other 
than the individual who wrote them. 
 
Wittgenstein disarms the feasibility of this scenario by suggesting that pain is not an absolute: it 
is a sensation to which one may freely append a symbol and thus, a rule for the application of 
that symbol. If an individual can append such a rule to that sensation, then any individual can 
manage to learn the same rule. 
 
In effect then, a private language is an innately flawed concept since such a language is not using 
a personalized vocabulary to demonstrate the intricacies of a personally held experience as 
though it were finite and knowable. A state of pain is unknowable as an absolute in either 
expressible quality or quantity, and therefore the assignment of a symbol to its experience is 
merely the equivalent of appending a ‘cue’ to it (Wittgenstein, 1953). Such cues can include 
words like ‘ow’, which indicate that pain has been experienced but can never accurately express 
the sensation itself. It is Wittgenstein’s assertion that we are trained in particular responsive cues, 
which we can call on to express something that we communally recognize as pain.  
 
Given that these cues are entirely learnable, the argument made by Wittgenstein is that a private 
language is effectively impossible. Despite any privately held experiences, these experiences can 
never be expressed in a language which only bears meaning to the user – such language will 
always be in the form of cues that are subject to communal mastery (1953). This is not to say that 
a pain experience is not irrevocably private, or that the internal machinations which result in such 
experiences are sharable. However, the pivotal question which stems from Wittgenstein’s 
musings is how is the knowing of private experiences to be achieved? 
 
Wittgenstein reflects on ‘cues’ as a method of making proper connections: knowing that when an 
individual feels pain, that there is a reasonable connection to be made between that and the 
appropriate, communally acceptable cue. How do we make these connections with play?  
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Play, Pain and Grammars 
 
With pain, we call on particular cues to express something that we communally recognize as pain 
– and we do so in a normative fashion through language. Wittgenstein would suggest that we 
learn to associate these cues as conventional expressions of pain due to our inability to express 
pain. It is argued here that this is, in many ways, no different from play. According to Williams, 
pain is “part of a reactive context” (Williams, 1999, p. 30). It is situational, behavioral and 
psychological. So is play.  
 
Play is a privately felt and often publicly experienced phenomenon that we develop ways of 
coming to communally know, through (although not exclusively) the exchange of linguistic cues. 
Like Wittgenstein’s conceptualization of pain, play straddles the line between private and public 
but, as stated by Malaby, play ontologically carries significant metaphysical baggage – we 
cannot generate a consistent definition as its sensation eludes language altogether (2007). 
 
This calls for a direct emphasis on examining the use of language as the site of meaning, not 
grappling with trying to reduce the sensation of play to a definition. If meaning is rooted in the 
linguistic exchanges and social practices of a community, as Wittgenstein would suggest, an 
evaluation of the cues which illustrate the conventionalized and even contested notions of play 
are of certain utilityiii. If cues reside in the social practices of a community, the meaning of play 
is to be found in these same social practices. 
 
Spontaneous and Normative Grammars 
 
Gramsci’s concepts of ‘spontaneous’ and ‘normative’ grammars are useful in investigating the 
nature of language, particularly as it pertains to the manner in which communal cues come to be 
pointed to as ‘play’ in in-game contexts.  
 
To briefly explicate, spontaneous grammars are those constantly emerging grammars of 
everyday exchange – new rules and modes of linguistic exchange which surface amid the use of 
traditional normative grammars. Spontaneous grammars emerge and are often taken up as 
normative grammars by a dominant regime in an effort to re-uphold particular paradigms, either 
consciously or unconsciously (Gramsci, 1971; Ives, 2004). 
 
Spontaneous grammars encapsulate the cues that emerge in communal contexts: we continually 
develop our social lexicon though our linguistic exchanges and praxis and, as Gramsci would 
contend, this lexicon evolves into a normative one (Gramsci, 1971; Ives, 2006). In game terms, 
there emerges an ostensible consent by players to accept the implicit grammars that permeate a 
game; a consent which sees a re-appropriation of seemingly self-evident ‘spontaneous’ 
grammars (such as ‘grinding’ in MMOs) as ‘normative’ ones (Gramsci, 1971, Ives, 2004). Niels 
Helsloot writes: 
 
 
 
 
Gramsci is in line with Wittgenstein; normativity is not a matter of opinions, but of 
a form of life […] Norms and rules develop within a community, parallel to the 
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political aims the community produces, in other words, to its self-definition. 
Normative grammar, and the efforts spent in patiently learning it, discipline people 
[.] 
(Helsloot, 1989, p. 557) 
 
At first glance, the manner in which meanings of play are established through Gramsci’s notion 
of ‘grammar’ may appear insidious in this way through their ‘disciplining’, but such conventions 
and their reification are frequently developed and assented to without having been catalyzed by 
malicious intent on the part of game designers. We accept particular conventions as normative 
but, as Wittgenstein would state, we do not necessarily agree to the meaning of these 
conventions because we understand them (1953). This does not mean that normative grammars 
‘inflict’ their meaning upon a naïve herd, it is simply that, “without conventions, we could not 
understand in the first place” (Smit, 1991, p. 49).  
 
We tend to approach the understanding of a concept as we become exposed to its array of 
contexts, activities, and the circumstances in which we establish the range of permissible 
meanings in and among a consensus (Wittgenstein, 1953). In a game context, then, we might 
visualize Gramsci’s concept in the following way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 
 
In the above scenario (Figure 1), we can observe a movement from the design of a game, to the 
development of spontaneous grammars around player engagement with that game, to the 
calcification of those grammars as normative. This results in the concretization of normative cues 
in language exchange, cues which themselves become normatively charged. Such cues then 
become fastened to the paradigm they arose from. 
 
A normative grammar becomes the common language […] this completes the circle 
whereby certain phases of spontaneous grammar become legitimated, justified and 
transformed into normative grammars.  The cycle comes full circle in that these 
formations […] act continuously on the spontaneous grammars imminent in the 
language. 
(Ives, 2006, p.45) 
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Cues and Conventions: The Example of Grinding 
 
As previously stated, it is Wittgenstein’s argument that we are trained in particular responsive 
cues, which we can call on to express something that we communally recognize as pain or, in 
this case, play. Given the above account of Gramsci’s grammars, I will employ the following 
example: grinding in MMOs.  
 
A massively multiplayer online game colloquialism, grinding refers to constant, repeated 
engagement with one or more (often already repetitive) tasks in the context of such games. These 
tasks are usually undertaken for the acquisition of in-game experience points or in-game virtual 
goods. Such tasks can require a player to do very little, such as clicking a mouse while remaining 
stationary, or even adopting the use of a specialized script or macro to automate the given task 
such that grinding can be conducted while unattended by the ‘player’.  
  
There has been significant and well-documented debate among players as to whether grinding 
qualifies as ‘play’ or even as an enjoyable game activity as a number of forum and blog posts 
illustrate (Taylor, 2006; McCrea, 2003). With grinding a now well-sedimented term in MMO 
discourse, it has come to enter normative grammars not only in-game, but also in exchanges 
between players in forums and between player and designers (GW Forums, 2008). In an MMO 
context, one might visualize Gramsci’s grammars cycle this way: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
 
This is not to say that grinding and play have been blindly equated with one another, but only 
that grinding has become well-established as a normative cue such that even players who do not 
believe grinding to be representative of what they know as play often need to refer to their notion 
of play as ‘normal play’ in forums of public exchange (see Figure 3). Such references legitimize 
the cue. 
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Figure 3 
 
In such a scenario, grinding begins displacing ‘play’ in language exchange, by requiring that 
‘normal play’ be at least distinguished from any play associated with the grinding process. Even 
for those who do not feel grinding to be congruent with their particular epistemology of play, 
‘grinding’ has become a cue which has become firmly planted in the normative exchanges of the 
community. In this scenario, ‘grinding’ is pinned down – the center of the discursive 
constellation around which notions of play begin to orbit.  
 
It should be noted that spontaneous and normative grammars are crucial to evaluating the 
linguistic dynamic within groups, but the political economic ramifications of this model should 
not be neglected either. Although this paper focuses on examining play though a lens of language 
and epistemology, Gramsci would note that changes in grammars around play are reinforced 
hegemonically (1971). When epistemologies are contributed, shared and consented to by players 
in ways that aid in re-shaping communal meanings of play (for example, the semiotic 
metamorphosis which sees grinding begin to ‘mean’ play within game communities), rhetorical 
hegemonies around play become expressed through gameplay – a subject for analysis in a later 
paper. This paper has sought to assume an epistemological lens which hopefully affords how we 
might understand play differently. Examining why epistemological constructions of play are 
ideologically scaffolded the way they are is a territory of investigation where Gramsci would 
surely have more purchase. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although this work may be an interrogation of past approaches to play, this paper has not been 
written under the banner of the ‘unconditional ought’. It is an attempt to pursue a line of thought 
that embraces play’s amorphous textures while also breaking past the barrier of sufficient 
reasoning in any determinations about its essential nature. Schopenhauer once said that, in using 
only sufficient reasoning, “we never reach the inner nature of things, but endlessly pursue 
phenomena only, moving without end or aim like a squirrel in its wheel” (1990, p. 274). In 
concordance with the thinking of Ludwig Wittgenstein, this work discards the notion that there is 
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an ‘inner nature’ of play to discover, but it does aim to move past the project which has thus far 
aimed to statically plot and reticulate the notion of play. Instead, this work wishes to evaluate the 
role of language in development of our knowledges of play. A closer examination of the cues 
and their contexts permit us a unique perspective on how we construct our knowledges of play in 
its discursive constellation. 
 
The Private Language argument and its treatment of phenomena such as pain serve as a 
springboard for looking closely at the sites of these cue exchanges, placing a greater emphasis on 
the epistemological dimensions of privately experienced phenomena such as play: the knowing 
of play through communal language exchange and the linguistic textures therein. This may 
permit us a greater understanding of play, not through defining it but unraveling it for what it is: 
a contextual tapestry of cues, linguistic exchanges and situated subjective experiences expressed 
and shaped communally. 
 
Analyses of game worlds (MMOs), for example, which take careful stock of the language used 
in game design, player exchanges, and cue transactions between player and game might afford 
new perspectives on what could change genres or allow designers to distinguish between play-
types in ways that would encourage design for divergent experiences under the canopy of the 
same game. Perhaps more to the point, such an analysis would allow developers to better 
understand their player, and thus their market. 
 
Designers such as Tim Carter and Richard Garriott have already pointed out the importance of 
language in design, acknowledging problems with nomenclature such as ‘grinding’ and 
expressing the need to alleviate contentious issues around language and game design through 
mindful practice (Gamasutra, 2007a & 2007b). An assiduous examination of cues and their 
exchange is something which could serve to inform the design process in the long term. 
 
One rejoinder to this paper’s argument may be that if we can only speak around a subject like 
play but never express it directly, what use can it possibly be? Although play may be beyond 
transcendental acquisition, this does not prevent greater or newer understanding of it – this is the 
lesson that Wittgenstein’s family resemblances embodies. It is not about arriving at an 
inexorably lacking, albeit well-organized, definition of play – we’ve managed to do that quite 
efficiently. Instead, this approach embraces acknowledging play as fleetingly discernable 
through knowledge construction, but nonetheless remaining ontologically indefinable. We all 
may ‘know’ what play is when we experience it, but its clarity is only in experience, its 
understanding only through silence. An evaluation of the linguistic currency we use to express 
play to one another may be what at least permits greater insight to how we come to know 
something so eminently inexpressible.  
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i Johan Huizinga theorized play as a self-contained spatiotemporal sphere which partitions off the rules 
and conduct within that space/time from the rest of the world (1950).   
 
ii Any presupposition of intention as a requisite condition of play in this paper is stipulatively applicable 
insofar as the cognitive intentions required for the establishment of Suits’ lusory attitude. For Suits, one 
needs to intend or will to know the conditions of one’s play before willing to enter into it, even if willing 
to not know (or care) is the prerequisite of a type of play which would see one trifling with an existing 
game’s institution (for example, if a person’s intention is to ruin a game, they have to first will to at least 
marginally assess and know its structure before they can attempt to undermine it with their own 
subversive, personally construed notion of play in that context). This suggests that in order to play, one 
needs to will to partake in what they have personally construed as that play. Whether it be pre-planned or 
emergent notions of play, Suits’ ‘lusory attitude’ revolves around the will to construe or knowledge build 
– and this paper revolves around the manner in which that knowledge building takes place. 
 
iii For purposes of speaking within the framework at hand, cues considered in this paper are restricted 
largely to the arena of the linguistic, but are certainly not limited to this arena in consideration of the 
broader applications of this line of thinking. Physical behavior, body language, and so forth, are all 
relevant constituents that make up the economy of cues discussed in this work. 
